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I. INTRODUCTION
The rules surrounding lawyers’ conflicts of interest are more defined than
those rules governing non-legal professionals.1 However, the conflict of
interest rules pertaining to former clerks2 are not as clear as the other rules
applicable to attorneys. The legal profession has addressed conflicts of
interest for lawyers, but not every jurisdiction has focused on the conflicts
stemming from work done while the attorney was still a law student.
Because conflict of interest rules protect the integrity of the profession and
the interests of current and former clients, 3 it is pertinent for the legal
community to address conflicts of interest that arise from work performed
as a clerk to more fully protect these interests.
The laws and rules governing conflicts of interest are broad, and the
answers to many legal ethics questions are not always clear.4 Should there
1. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (outlining the conflicts
of interest an attorney may encounter with a current client and detailing how disqualification can be
avoided); Id. at r. 1.8 (identifying the specific conflicts of interest that may arise from an attorney’s
representation of a current client); Id. at r. 1.9 (describing the duties an attorney owes to a former
client); Id. at r. 1.10 (offering well-defined parameters for when a conflict of interest is imputed to an
attorney’s firm, as well as how imputation may be avoided).
2. For purposes of this Comment, unless otherwise specified, the terms “law clerk(s)” and
“clerk(s)” will refer to law-school students performing legal responsibilities at a legal entity.
3. See United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591, 592–93 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
(stressing the importance of avoiding conflicts of interest because the failure to do so could jeopardize
private communications between an attorney and their client and harm “the integrity of the judicial
process”).
4. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). See also Monroe
H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH.
L. REV. 1469, 1469 (1966) (indicating three difficult questions lawyers face in maintaining their ethical
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be a rule requiring the disqualification of a lawyer because of past work
experiences while still in law school? Is a law clerk more analogous to a
lawyer or some other legal position, such as a paralegal? The rules relating
to conflicts of interest arising from time spent as a legal intern or law clerk
for a firm are not well defined. The American Bar Association (ABA) briefly
addresses the subject in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the
Model Rules) in a comment to the rule discussing imputation of conflicts of
interest.5 Nonetheless, not all states have adopted the Model Rules,6 and
not all states that have adopted them accept and apply their rules uniformly.7
In August 2014, the Supreme Court of Texas’s Professional Ethics
Committee issued an opinion detailing how firms should deal with potential
conflicts of interest that arise when a firm hires a new attorney who
previously worked for opposing counsel as a clerk. 8 The Committee’s
opinion advocated a firm’s withdrawal from such client representation
because of the former clerk’s possible knowledge of confidential
information causing a conflict of interest.9
In March 2016, the Texas Supreme Court amended rule 1.06 of the Texas

duties).
5. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (indicating
when applying the imputation conflict of interest guidelines to nonlawyer professionals, a firm is not
prohibited from “representation if [a] lawyer is prohibited from acting because of events before the
person became a lawyer, for example, work that the person did as a law student”).
6. California is the only state missing from a list of jurisdictions that adopted the Model Rules.
See State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_s
tate_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited May 29, 2017) (listing the dates of adoption of the Model
Rules for the forty-nine states and including the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands).
Further, besides differing remarkably in format, the California rules vary significantly from the Model
Rules. See CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3-310 (2015) (excluding any mention of how a law
firm should address conflicts of interest when a lawyer, previously in the capacity of a legal intern or
law clerk, worked on a case adverse to their present client).
7. Compare CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10(a)(2) (2016) (providing an exception to
imputation when the disqualified attorney is screened and proper notice is provided), with ALA. RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 (2016) (failing to establish a screening exception for firm imputation due
to an attorney’s conflict of interest).
8. Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 644, 77 TEX. B.J. 848, 849 (2014) (interpreting Texas rules
to require a law firm “withdraw from representing a client in a lawsuit” if they hire an attorney who
worked as a “clerk for the law firm representing the opposing party”).
9. See id. at 849 (stressing a former law clerk “is conclusively presumed to have confidential
information concerning [client A] and its claim against [client B]” in the situation where the law clerk
worked for the firm who represented client A in its claim against client B). This is qualified based on
whether or not the clerk assisted in the particular case. Id.
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Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. 10 This new amendment
specifically permits a law firm to represent a client if the lawyer in question
would only be conflicted because of work he or she did as a legal intern or
law clerk and was properly screened from the case. 11 The amendment
necessitated the Texas Committee on Professional Ethics to revisit their
previous opinion in which the Committee concluded the opposite of its
former opinion. The Committee subsequently amended Opinion 644 in
accord with the new rule from the Texas Supreme Court.12
This conflict of interest issue—what to do when a nonlawyer who worked
in a legal setting begins working at another firm after they become a
lawyer—is not new.13 Many states and the ABA have previously addressed
this issue when it comes to paralegals and legal assistants; however the issue,
as it pertains to clerks, is less clear.14 Nineteen states have no provision in
their rules of professional conduct that tackle this issue.15 Texas attempted
10. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06 cmt. 19, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2016) (allowing representation by a law firm whose
participation would be prohibited “merely because a lawyer of the firm has a conflict of interest arising
from events that occurred before the person became a lawyer, such as work that the person did as a
law clerk or intern”).
11. Id.
12. Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 644 Revised, 79 TEX. B.J. 609, 609 (2016).
13. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (interpreting
the provision as permitting nonlawyers to be screened to avoid imputation).
14 . See Daines v. Alcatel, S.A., 194 F.R.D. 678, 684 (E.D. Wash. 2000) (concluding
disqualification was not required since the firm put appropriate screening measures into effect
immediately upon hiring a paralegal who previously worked for opposing counsel); Hodge v. URFASexton, LP, 758 S.E.2d 314, 323–24 (Ga. 2014) (finding appropriate screening measures were taken
upon the firm being informed of the nonlawyer conflict of interest, thus avoiding imputed
disqualification to the firm); Green v. Toledo Hosp., 764 N.E.2d 979, 979–80 (Ohio 2002) (holding
there was no error when the judge ruled the attorney and the firm should be disqualified from the
litigation because the firm hired the legal secretary of an opposing firm); Hayes v. Cent. States
Orthopedic Specialists Inc., 51 P.3d 562, 564 (Okla. 2002) (stating the trial court erred when it ruled
the hiring of a legal secretary from opposing counsel’s firm disqualified their firm in representing the
client in the litigation even though the firm arranged a “Chinese Wall” screening device to prevent the
flow of confidential information from the employee to other members of the firm); In re Columbia
Valley Healthcare Sys., L.P., 320 S.W.3d 819, 829 (Tex. 2010) (concluding “the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to disqualify [the law firm]” representing opposing party because they hired a
legal secretary who had done a substantial amount of work on the litigation at hand); see also Widger v.
Ownes-Corning Fiberglass Corp. (In re Complex Asbestos Litig.), 283 Cal. Rptr. 732, 751 (App. 1991)
(stressing the court “must balance the important right to counsel of one’s choice balancing the
competing interests of the client to be able to select counsel of their own choice against the competing
fundamental interest in preserving confidences of the attorney–client relationship”).
15. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3-310 (2016) (failing to acknowledge whether
there is imputation of a conflict of interest when one of the lawyers at the firm previously worked on
a case adverse to one of the firm’s clients when the attorney was still a law student).
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to address the issue in an ethics committee opinion which was ultimately
reversed as a result of the Texas Supreme Court amendment to rule 1.06 of
the Texas Disciplinary Rules—now inline with the standard set by
the Model Rules. 16 Conversely, other states remain entirely silent on
the issue.17
This Comment aims to address the law’s ambiguity on how former clerks
should be treated once they become attorneys, specifically in regards to
conflicts of interest that arise from clerkships they had during law school.
Section II of this Comment focuses on background information pertaining
to conflicts of interest, and how conflicts may be avoided or dealt with when
they do occur. Section III analyzes the current state of the law regarding
conflicts of interest that arise because of a lawyer’s experiences as a law
student. In addition, Section III examines conflicts of analogous nonattorney firm employees and how they relate to the conflicts a law student
may face, as well as the economic and educational implications of a rule
imposing conflicts of interest on law students that would follow them into
their career. In closing, Section IV proposes a solution that protects the
interests of clients while complying with the Model Rules and preventing
the attachment of unnecessary implications to a law student that could later
affect their legal career.
II. HISTORIC AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A conflict of interest is “[a] real or seeming incompatibility between the
interests of two of a lawyer’s clients, such that the lawyer is disqualified from
representing both clients if the dual representation adversely affects either
client or if the clients do not consent.”18

16. Compare Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 644 Revised, supra note 12, at 609–10 (finding a
law firm would not be required to withdraw from representation if a lawyer had previously been
involved with the case prior to becoming a lawyer), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 1.10
cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (concluding the same).
17. See KAN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 (2015) (declaring a firm may not knowingly
represent a party when any attorney at the firm would be precluded from practicing alone but remaining
silent about conflicts arising from when the attorney was a law student); LA. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.10 (2016) (outlining imputation of conflict rules without indicating that the rule applies
to a former law student’s conflicts); N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 (2015) (ignoring whether
conflicts of interest arise from work done as a law student).
18. Conflict of Interest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Plumlee v. Masto,
512 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted) (referring to Black’s Law Dictionary for
the legal definition of conflict of interest).
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A. When Does a Conflict of Interest Arise?
Conflicts of interest can arise in a variety of situations, and the
appropriate response to handling a conflict is not always clear.19 The courts
and the ABA have sought to establish bright-line rules for conflicts of
interest; however, this is not a simple task.20 Forty-nine states have adopted
the Model Rules in some variation,21 but California has fashioned their own
rules, including a conflict of interest rule, for attorney ethics.22
The different types of conflicts of interest include “concurrent client
conflicts,23 former client conflicts, [and] lawyer-to-client conflicts.”24 This
Comment focuses on the interests of former clients. The Restatement
indicates an issue arises when a former client’s interests are materially
adverse to a present client’s interests in a substantially related matter, which
it defines as: (1) a “current matter” the lawyer is seeking to work on that
19. See Marc I. Steinberg & Timothy U. Sharpe, Attorney Conflicts of Interest: The Need for a Coherent
Framework, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1990) (illustrating the vagueness that often surrounds
conflict of interest scenarios and pointing out that the answers are not always clear).
20. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (providing a plethora
of commentary regarding different scenarios in which the rule would or would not apply); see also
Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983) (describing the method in which their analysis
was to proceed by first inquiring as to whether a substantial relationship between the two
representations exists and then delving into whether the attorney rebutted the presumption of shared
confidences with either representation); Burgess-Lester v. Ford Motor Co., 643 F. Supp. 2d 811, 814–
16 (N.D. W. Va. 2008) (citation omitted) (considering the rulings of other courts on how to determine
if an attorney is disqualified from representation and opting to follow the Schiessle analysis as a brightline standard); cf. Essex Cty. Jail Annex Inmates v. Treffinger, 18 F. Supp. 2d 418, 444 (D.N.J. 1998)
(“While in an ordinary case the appropriate standard may very well be the potential prejudice at trial,
this is not an ordinary case.”).
21. State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 6.
22. While California has developed its own rules for representation amidst adverse interests, its
rule still uses some language similar to the Model Rules. Compare CAL. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3310 (2015) (indicating a conflict of interest may be overcome with a client’s informed consent in certain
circumstances), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (providing
some conflicts of interest may be permissible with a client’s informed consent). California case law
indicates “[c]onflicts of interest may arise in a variety of circumstances where an attorney assumes a
role other than as an attorney at law adverse to an existing client.” Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard,
Mullin, Richter & Hampton, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 685, 701–02 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
23. A concurrent conflict of interest arises when an attorney undertakes a representation that
may be materially limited by the attorney’s own personal interest or the responsibilities the attorney
owes “to another client, a former client[,] or third person.” This centers on the duty of loyalty that an
attorney owes their client. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2013) (“Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a
client.”). Alternatively, a conflict of interest can also arise if representation of a party would be “directly
adverse to another client.” Id. at r. 1.7(a).
24. W. William Hodes, Getting Lawyer Disqualification Straight, 17 GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICS 339,
342 (2004) (book review).
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deals with the work the attorney previously did in representing the former
client; or (2) a current matter in which “there is a substantial risk” of using
information gained from past representation of the former client.25 The
purpose of conflict of interest rules is to prevent the disclosure of
confidential or sensitive information obtained from the former client.26 In
essence, it would be fundamentally unfair (and not in the interest of justice)
to allow one side to have superior, inside knowledge of the opposing side’s
arguments and legal strategy.27
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 (AM. LAW INST. 2000);
see Green v. Montgomery Cty., 784 F. Supp. 841, 843 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (asserting that Rule 1.9 from
Alabama’s Rules of Professional Conduct is essentially “a codification of the standard articulated in the
landmark case of T.C. Theater Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures”); T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (acknowledging payment of the attorney’s fee does
not end the duty of loyalty owed to the client except as provided by law, and recognizing if the subject
matter of the former client’s representation is substantially related to a subsequent adverse
representation, then representation of the new client is barred); Porter v. Huber, 68 F. Supp. 132, 135
(W.D. Wash. 1946) (finding the former client’s interests were possibly jeopardized through the
disclosure of information by counsel who had formerly represented them and holding this was grounds
for barring counsel from representing the client); People v. Gerold, 107 N.E. 165, 177 (Ill. 1914)
(emphasizing this ethics rule is “rigid” because even the most honest of practitioners should not place
himself in a situation where he is forced to choose between the duties owed to separate clients that are
in conflict).
26. See Note, Disqualification of Attorneys for Representing Interests Adverse to Former Clients, 64 YALE
L.J. 917, 918 (1955) (citations omitted) (“Disqualification rules were fashioned at common law to assure
the public that any information confided in an attorney would never be disclosed or utilized adversely
without the client’s permission.”); Keith Swisher, The Practice and Theory of Lawyer Disqualification,
27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 71, 80 (2014) (indicating the conflict of interest and disqualification rules
were put in place to prevent an attorney from not fulfilling his fiduciary duty to his current or former
client by disclosing or acting on sensitive information); see also Consol. Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros.
Circuit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Nickerson), 216 F.2d 920, 924–25 (2d Cir. 1954) (noting concern over an
attorney’s possession of a former client’s confidential information and disqualifying the lawyer despite
the lack of evidence that any of the information passed from the lawyer to the new clients); GEO
Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Husisian, 951 F. Supp. 2d 32, 43–44 (D.D.C. 2013) (rejecting the claim of
conflict of interest since no showing was made that confidential information was shared, but
proceeding to inquire into whether a substantial relationship existed between the representations of
the former client and the new client that would cause the attorney to take an adverse stance to one of
them); In re Boone, 83 F. 944, 964 (N.D. Cal. 1897) (finding the lawyer had special and peculiar
knowledge in relation to his former client and imposing a penalty of disbarment for the unethical
behavior exhibited by using such knowledge against the former client).
27. Cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (indicating a client may be denied
effective assistance of counsel when the attorney is burdened by a conflict of interest, and agreeing a
presumption of prejudice applies to such a claim (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345–50
(1980))); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) (asserting Sixth Amendment concerns
regarding ineffective assistance of counsel may result from a conflict of interest), superseded on other
grounds by FED. R. EVID. 104(a); United States v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th Cir. 1978)
(emphasizing an attorney, either retained or appointed, who operates under the burden of an actual
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B. Duty Owed to the Client
Attorneys owe a fiduciary duty to their clients.28 This includes both a
duty of care29 and a duty of loyalty.30 Lawyers must act solely in the interest
of their client.31 The fiduciary duty extends from a lawyer to their client
conflict of interest is incapable of representing their client effectively without prejudicing the case);
Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461, 463–64 (5th Cir. 1962) (arguing constitutional rights may be
implicated when conflicts of interest arise due to a lawyer’s representation of multiple clients because
the parties are deprived of a fair trial).
28. See John F. Sutton, Jr., Guidelines to Professional Responsibility, 39 TEX. L. REV. 391, 406 (1961)
(“Fidelity of advocate to client is of course fundamental to our adversary system of justice.”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2000)
(asserting a lawyer must “comply with obligations concerning the client’s confidences and property,
avoid impermissible conflicting interests, deal honestly with the client, and not employ advantages
arising from the client-lawyer relationship in a manner adverse to the client”); see also Mickens v. Taylor,
535 U.S. 162, 183 (2002) (affirming an attorney owes a fiduciary duty to their client even upon death
of the client); Von Motke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725 (1948) (“The right to counsel guaranteed by the
Constitution contemplates the services of an attorney devoted solely to the interests of his client.”
(quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942))); Campbell Harrison & Dagley L.L.P. v. Lisa
Blue/Baron & Blue, 843 F. Supp. 2d 673, 685–86 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (listing common violations of an
attorney’s fiduciary duty, such as “failure to disclose a conflict of interest” or improper use of a client’s
confidences (citing Goffney v. Rabson, 56 S.W.3d 186, 193 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001,
pet denied))); State v. Vaughn, 859 N.W.2d 492, 504 (Iowa 2015) (Appel, J., concurring specially)
(citations omitted) (stressing the duty of loyalty an attorney owes to their client is “essential”); Beck v.
Law Offices of Edwin J. (Ted) Terry, Jr., P.C., 284 S.W.3d 416, 428–29 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no
pet.) (“In addition to the duty of ordinary care, an attorney owes fiduciary duties to his client as a matter
of law.” (citing Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988))); State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357,
359 (Utah 1994) (“The faithful discharge of [the] duty [of loyalty] is a vital factor both in uncovering
and making clear to a court the truth on which a just decision depends and in protecting the rights of
persons charged with a crime.”).
29. See Marc R. Greenough, Note, The Inadmissibility of Professional Ethical Standards in Legal
Malpractice Actions After Hizey v. Carpenter, 68 WASH. L. REV. 395, 397 (1993) (“To conform to the
duty of care, an attorney must possess and exercise the degree of care, skill, diligence, and knowledge
commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful, and prudent lawyer in the [s]tate of
Washington.”); see also In re Hatten, 592 A.2d 896, 899 (Vt. 1991) (“The appropriate standard of care is
‘that degree of care, skill, diligence[,] and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a
reasonable, careful[,] and prudent lawyer in the practice of law in this jurisdiction.’” (quoting Russo v.
Griffin, 510 A.2d 436, 438 (Vt. 1986))).
30. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (contending an
attorney still owes a duty of loyalty to the former client when the attorney moves from one firm to
another); see also Bonin v. California, 494 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting to the denial
of certiorari) (“When a known conflict undermines counsel’s duty of loyalty, ‘perhaps the most basic
of counsel’s duties,’ . . . a court must presume the counsel’s divided loyalties adversely affected his
performance on behalf of his client.” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)));
Mazon v. Krafchick, 144 P.3d 1168, 1172 (Wash. 2006) (holding co-counsel on a case each owe their
client an undivided duty of loyalty).
31. See Mueller v. Guardian Life Ins., 143 F.3d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding the attorney did
not act in a manner in accord with his duty to act solely for the client’s benefit).
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and is a “special and onerous” duty.32 Indeed, the attorney must act solely
in the interest of their client and not in the interest of the attorney
themselves.33
The duty of loyalty is of paramount concern to the attorney–client
relationship.34 It is the attorney’s obligation to ensure conflicts of interest
do not arise as a result of relationships with former clients. 35 If such
conflict of interest does arise, the attorney must withdraw from the
representation.36
32. Charles W. Wolfram, A Cautionary Tale: Fiduciary Breach As Legal Malpractice, 34 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 689, 689 (2006) (proclaiming different members of the legal profession unanimously agree there
is a fiduciary duty attorneys owe to their clients, and this duty is an “onerous” one).
33. See Mueller, 143 F.3d at 416 (concluding the attorney did not breach “his duty to act solely for
[the client’s] benefit”); Kimleco Petrol., Inc. v. Morrison & Shelton, 91 S.W.3d 921, 923 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied) (“A breach of fiduciary duty occurs when an attorney benefits
improperly from the attorney–client relationship by, among other things, subordinating his client’s
interests to his own . . . .” (citing Goffney v. Rabson, 56 S.W.3d 186, 193 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2001, pet. denied))). The duty an attorney owes the client may still exist regardless of whether a
client satisfies their obligation to pay the attorney. See T.C. Theatre Corp., 113 F. Supp. at 268 (“A
lawyer’s duty of absolute loyalty to his client’s interests does not end with his retainer. He is enjoined
for all time, except as he may be released by law, from disclosing matters revealed to him by reason of
the confidential relationship.”); cf. In re Thomsen, 499 P.2d 815, 816 (Or. 1972) (asserting an attorney,
in the situation where they have not informed the client that they have not paid in full, may not
unilaterally withdraw from representing the client as a result of nonpayment without permission from
the court). Analogously stringent duties exist between trustees and beneficiaries, as well as companies
and their shareholders. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981)
(asserting a trustee owes an unwavering, undivided fiduciary duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries in
administering the trust); see also Mfrs. Tr. Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304, 315 (1949) (Burton, J., dissenting)
(“While corporate directors are not classed as express trustees, their obligations to their respective
corporations are fiduciary in nature.”).
34. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 15, 21 (1987) (“In the relationship with a client, the lawyer is required above all to
demonstrate loyalty.”); Eli Wald, Loyalty in Limbo: The Peculiar Case of Attorneys’ Loyalty to Clients, 40 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 909, 911 (2009) (“Attorney loyalty to clients is considered a cornerstone of the attorney–
client relationship.” (first citing CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 146 (West
Publishing Co. 1986); and then citing Hazard, Jr., supra)).
35. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.09(a), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A, art. X, § 9, r. 1.09 (West 2016) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9)
(prohibiting Texas’s lawyers from representing a client in certain matters adverse to a former client,
and imputing this conflict of interest to the attorney’s firm).
36. See Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (holding once a conflict of interest arises, an attorney has a duty to withdraw from
the representation “as soon as practical, but only after taking ‘reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable
prejudice to the rights of [her] client, including giving due notice to [the] client [and] allowing time for
employment of other counsel’”); see also Concat LP v. Unilever, PLC, 350 F. Supp. 2d 796, 822 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (concluding a firm violated its duty of loyalty despite the firm’s attempts to prevent the
breach through screening since screening serves the role of protecting confidential information and
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C. Imputed Disqualification
Conflicts may arise even when an individual attorney is not personally
conflicted in representing a client but when a law firm itself is conflicted.37
This form of a conflict of interest is referred to as imputation.38 Conflicts
of interest follow an attorney from firm-to-firm throughout their career.39
When an attorney starts working at a new law firm, a conflicts check must
be performed, in which the new firm analyzes past cases the attorney
participated in that may create a conflict with the interests of the clients the
new law firm represents.40
The law’s modern trend generally holds that when a lawyer is individually
prohibited from representing a client, then that attorney’s entire firm is likely
to be prohibited as well.41 The rules of imputation vary from state-to-state
depending upon how recently the state updated their professional conduct
was insufficient to preserve loyalty where two partners in the same firm concurrently represented
adverse parties).
37. See United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1523 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[I]f one attorney in a firm
has an actual conflict of interest, we impute that conflict to all the attorneys in the firm, subjecting the
entire firm to disqualification.” (citing United States v. Kitchin, 592 F.2d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 1979)));
Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 847 F.2d 725, 729–30 (11th Cir. 1988) (reiterating an attorney’s prior
representation is imputed to their current firm’s partners and employees); Wade v. Nationwide Mut.
Fire Ins., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1328 (S.D. Ala. 2002) (“Disqualification may be either ‘actual,’ based
on the attorney’s own relation to the movant, or ‘imputed,’ based on the attorney’s relation to another
attorney disqualified from representing the movant.”).
38. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“While lawyers
are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them
practicing alone would be prevented from doing so . . . .”); see also ProEducation Int’l, Inc. v. Mindprint
(In re ProEducation Int’l, Inc.), 587 F.3d 296, 300 (5th Cir. 2009) (recognizing “imputation can be
removed when an attorney leaves a law firm” so the potential for conflicts to arise based on that
attorney’s prior representations is removed).
39. See Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna, Fed. Ins., 632 F. Supp. 418, 422 (D. Del. 1986)
(disqualifying an attorney, who was employed at a new firm, from representing a client with interests
adverse to a co-defendant of the attorney’s former client since the attorney had gained confidential
information about the co-defendant).
40 . See Healthnet, Inc. v. Health Net Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 755, 763 (S.D. W. Va. 2003)
(contending “a thorough conflicts check would have uncovered this problem” and noting the attorney
and the entire firm should be disqualified); Bank Brussells Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), 220 F.
Supp. 2d 283, 287–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he purpose of the conflict review . . . is to maintain the
fiduciary duties of loyalty and confidentiality owed to the client.” (citing Kassis v. Teacher’s Ins. &
Annuity Ass’n, 717 N.E. 2d 674, 674 (N.Y. 1999))); In re Conduct of Robeson, 652 P.2d 336, 343 (Or.
1982) (per curiam) (noting a conflicts check was conducted but it produced a negative result); In re
Guar. Ins. Servs., 343 S.W.3d 130, 132 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam) (indicating the law firm conducted an
initial conflicts check on a new, nonlawyer staff member prior to the start of their employment).
41. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (mandating a law
firm’s disqualification in representing a client if an individual lawyer in the firm would be disqualified
from the representation, but providing exceptions to the general rule).
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rules and whether the state strictly follows the Model Rules.42
D.

Screening
A process known as “screening” is a mechanism commonly utilized to
avoid firm-wide imputation of a firm’s new employee’s conflict of interest.43
This practice is meant to limit the possibility that a legal worker will share
confidential or privileged information after side-switching to an opposing
counsel’s employ.44 Screening occurs after a conflicts check is conducted
during which the firm interviews the potential employee regarding cases
they have previously worked on.45
The Model Rules allow for nonlawyers and law students to be screened
out of imputation.46 This is due to the fact that lawyers owe the duty to their
clients,47 and are the ones responsible for the actions of their employees.48
Thus, lawyers must adhere to stricter rules than nonlawyers because of these
duties.
42. Compare MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015) (requiring a new lawyer to
“be screened from any personal participation in the matter” based on conflicts they acquired during
their time as a law clerk), and MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2013) (choosing to permit a firm to screen a new attorney from personal participation in a matter in
which they have a conflict of interest resulting from a clerkship position, and indicating such screening
measures avoid imputation of the conflict), with MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 (2015)
(failing to address the issue of whether an attorney’s firm is conflicted out of client representation based
on the attorney’s past law clerk experience).
43. See VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 375 (West 2011)
(“[Screening] isolates the conflicted lawyer from the representation in question and thereby obviates
the risk that the client’s representation will be distorted.”).
44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124 cmt. D(ii) (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (“Screening must assure that confidential client information will not pass from the
personally prohibited lawyer to any other lawyer in the firm.”).
45. See Susan Saab Fortney & Jett Hanna, Fortifying a Law Firm’s Ethical Infrastructure: Avoiding
(“A conflicts
Legal Malpractice Claims Based on Conflicts of Interest, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 669, 681 (2002)
check is the process of identifying the persons whose interests an attorney must consider, and
determining whether those interests require action in order to avoid conflict related claims.”).
46. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (noting
imputation of the entire firm can be avoided where a conflict of interest emerges from a non-attorney
member of the firm’s staff).
47. Cf. Adrienne T. McCoy, Comment, Law Student Advocates and Conflicts of Interest, 73 WASH. L.
REV. 731, 734 (1998) (stating law clerks do not develop attorney–client relationships with a firm’s
clients); Frances P. Kao, No, a Paralegal Is Not a Lawyer, A.B.A. BUS. L. SEC. (Jan.–Feb. 2007),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2007/01/full-issue200701.authcheckdam.pdf (“[A] paralegal may not establish the attorney–client relationship.”).
48. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“[A] lawyer having
direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer . . . .”).

2017]

COMMENT

387

Absent a conflicts check and subsequent screening, the entire firm could
be subject to imputation, which would require it to withdraw from
representing a client altogether because of the duty of loyalty attorneys owe
to their client. 49 These rules pertain to lawyers and non-attorney
employees, such as paralegals or legal assistants.50 Whether the screening
rules apply to clerks who previously worked for opposing counsel during
law school is not as evident. Are they non-attorney workers who need to
be screened when they go on to become attorneys employed by an opposing
firm? Not all states require attorneys to be screened because of a conflict
that results from work they performed while they were still a law student.51
The conflict rules pertaining to licensed attorneys working for an
opposing firm are brighter. Lawyers move from firm-to-firm more
frequently than they did in the past.52 Law students attempt to experience
many different legal environments throughout their law school tenure as
they seek to gain experience prior to passing the bar and finding postgraduation employment.53 It is likely that conflicts of interest could easily
arise since a law student can change jobs with less hassle and commitment
than an established attorney given the abundance of different employment
opportunities while in law school.54
The difference between conflicts of interest that arise when a lawyer is
49. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“The rule
of imputed disqualification . . . gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers
who practice in a law firm.”).
50. See Daines, 194 F.R.D. at 682 (“If those non-attorneys violate th[e] ethical obligations, the
supervising attorneys can be held responsible.”).
51. See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-1.10 cmt. para. 7 (2015) (allowing non-attorneys
to be screened but not mentioning law students’ conflicts). See generally GA. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.10 (2015) (omitting any reference to screening measures as it relates to law students as
well as other non-attorney professionals).
52. See Lee A. Pizzimenti, Screen Verité: Do Rules About Ethical Screens Reflect the Truth About RealLife Law Firm Practice?, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 305, 305 (1997) (“As law firms have grown markedly
through mergers and lateral hiring, the probability of disqualifying conflicts of interest has
exponentially increased.”).
53 . See Internship and Summer Associate Program, OFF. ATT’Y GEN., http://oag.dc.gov/page/
internship-summer-prgm (last visited May 29, 2017) (including the various tasks a legal intern could
expect to participate in, including assisting attorneys with drafting memoranda and doing legal research,
among other things); see also McCoy, supra note 47 (“The major responsibilities of [clerkship] positions
include research, writing legal memoranda and briefs, drafting motions, and performing important
background functions.” (quoting Susan D. Kovac, Part-Time Employment of Full-Time Law Students: A
Problem or an Opportunity, 58 TENN. L. REV. 669, 698–700 (1991))).
54. See McCoy, supra note 47 (“Law students have many opportunities to perform legal work
while in law school. The most traditional student positions are clerkships for law firms or externships
for judges.” (citing Kovac, supra note 53)).
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admitted to practice law versus when an individual is preparing for bar
admission is murky. It is a serious question and one that needs to be more
adequately addressed. The Texas Committee on Professional Ethics
attempted to answer this question in a recent ethics opinion issued in August
of 2014.55 According to the Committee at that time, conflicts of interest
arising from experience gained while in law school should be treated
similarly to a licensed attorney’s conflicts derived from changing firms.56
This was later revised in 2016 following the amendment to the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct by the Texas Supreme Court.57
But what about other non-attorney legal workers who are not in law
school? There are many roles in the legal profession, yet not all follow the
same strict measures or have such carefully defined rules as an attorney
does.58 For example, paralegals and legal assistants do not face the same
strict imputation rules as attorneys do.59
Generally, it is the district or trial court that has the responsibility to
determine whether a conflict exists.60 There are different remedies and
sanctions that follow a conflict of interest finding by a court.61 A trial judge
may dismiss an attorney from participation in a case where the attorney
engaged in conflicts that breached the duty they owed to a former client.62
55. Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 644, supra note 8.
56. Id. at 849.
57. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06 cmt. 19, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2016).
58. See Widger v. Owners-Corning Fiberglass Corp. (In re Complex Asbestos Litig.), 283 Cal.
Rptr. 732, 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“The courts have discussed extensively the remedies for the ethical
problems created by attorneys changing their employment from a law firm representing one party in
litigation to a firm representing an adverse party. Considerably less attention has been given to the
problems posed by nonlawyer employees of law firms who do the same.”).
59 . See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“The
[imputation rule] does not prohibit representation by others in the law firm where the person
prohibited from involvement in the matter is a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or legal secretary.”).
60. See Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1134 (9th Cir. 1994) (writing a trial judge should
ensure the defendant is aware a conflict of interest exists when there are third parties paying legal fees).
61. See Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1245–46 (2d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted)
(“[C]uriously, the power of the federal courts to disqualify attorneys in litigation pending before them
has long been assumed without discussion . . . .”); see also In re Park-Helena Corp., 63 F.3d 877, 882
(9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) (declaring a “failure to disclose fully relevant information” can result
in disgorgement of all fees an attorney has collected); In re Carpenter, 155 P.3d 937, 944 (Wash. 2007)
(affirming the suspension of an attorney for violations of conflict of interest rules and holding
disciplinary measures were appropriate).
62. See Roe v. United States (In re Doe), 781 F.2d 238, 251 (2d Cir. 1986) (en banc) (“[C]ourts
have the power and duty to disqualify counsel where the public interest in maintaining the integrity of
the judicial system outweighs the accused’s constitutional right.”); cf. Wheat v. United States,
486 U.S. 153, 159–60 (1988) (noting an individual does not have an absolute right to choose an attorney
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A judge also has the discretion to sanction an attorney for failing to initially
detect or avoid the conflict.63
E. Analogous Conflicts
Other members of the legal community, such as adjudicatory officials,
may also have conflict issues arise. 64 Issues resulting from conflicts
between adjudicatory officials and the attorneys or parties in their
courtroom have been litigated at length.65 States adopted rules to deal with
interests that a former judge or adjudicatory official may have with the
litigating parties.66 One of the most obvious problems with adjudicatory
conflicts of interest is where a presiding judge has a direct pecuniary interest
in the outcome of the proceedings before them.67
when the attorney is otherwise barred because of duties owed to opposing parties); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (commenting on disclosure of
information that is adverse to the client, and recognizing “the public interest is usually best served by
a strict rule requiring lawyers to preserve the confidentiality of information relating to the
representation of their clients” but there are limited exceptions).
63. See Rome v. Braunstein, 19 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 182–
83 (1st Cir. 1987)) (holding the Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy court to impose sanctions upon
an attorney, such as “disqualification and the denial or disgorgement of all fees,” for not avoiding an
“impermissible” conflict); see also 11 U.S.C. § 328(c) (2005) (“[T]he court may deny allowance of
compensation for services and reimbursement of expenses . . . [if] such professional person is not a
disinterested person, or represents or holds an interest adverse to the interest of the estate with respect
to the matter on which such professional person is employed.”); In re Shea, 273 P.3d 612, 622 (Alaska
2012) (citations omitted) (indicating the ABA standards may issue an appropriate sanction if an attorney
breaches a duty owed to a court, to a client, or to the legal system and thereby “causes injury or potential
injury”).
64. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 880 (2009) (recognizing that a judge, in
addition to the conflict that may arise from having a pecuniary interest in the case, may have a conflict
of interest due to their participation in an earlier stage of the case).
65. See id. at 884 (holding a judge should have recused himself due to “a risk of actual bias”
created by presiding over a case where an individual made substantial contributions to the judge’s
campaign); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 524 (1927) (concluding the mayor of a town could not serve
as an adjudicatory official in a proceeding in which he has a direct pecuniary interest since he was
entitled to a portion of the fine collected).
66 . See COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.12(a)(c) (West 2015) (prohibiting the
representation of a client by a lawyer who previously served as an adjudicatory official on the same
matter, including imputation of the firm if one lawyer is disqualified from representation); N.Y. RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.12 (West 2015) (providing the ethical standards governing former judges
and other adjudicatory officials’ subsequent representations and employment); see also MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.12(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (declaring a lawyer shall not represent a client
in a matter in which the lawyer previously served as an adjudicatory official).
67. See Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535 (holding the defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial judge
was violated where the presiding adjudicatory official was the town’s mayor, who had a “direct
pecuniary interest in the outcome” and a motive to fine the defendant “to help the financial needs of
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Because judges hire law clerks to assist them in their decision-making
process, 68 ethics rules have been promulgated for judicial law clerks of
adjudicatory officials. 69 One concern is that a judicial law clerk could
extend their influence or provide information to sway the decisions of a
judge or other adjudicatory officials.70
The rules governing conflicts of interest are constantly changing and
evolving. What was deemed acceptable conduct for an attorney in the past
may not be tolerated today. 71 The rules that were once “relevant” to
the village”); Cty. of Cheshire v. City of Keene, 314 A.2d 639, 641 (N.H. 1974) (per curiam) (first citing
Op. of the Justices, 183 A.2d 909, 912–13 (N.H. 1962); and then citing Sherman v. Brentwood,
290 A.2d 47, 48 (N.H. 1972)) (“The standard of review for determining a conflict of interest is whether
the judicial officer has a direct personal and pecuniary interest in the matter before it.”). Compare Ward
v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59–60 (1972) (citing Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523, 532–34 (1927) (relying
upon the principles set forth in Tumey v. Ohio to conclude that a city official—the mayor—was not an
impartial judge because of his financial interest in the outcome of the case), with Aetna Life Ins. v.
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825–26 (1986) (citations omitted) (limiting the scope of Tumey v. Ohio by
categorizing a “slight” pecuniary interest as insufficient to create the potential for impartiality that
would require an adjudicatory official’s disqualification).
68. See Parker B. Potter, Jr., Law Clerks Gone Wild, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 173, 175 (2010)
(discussing the varied roles a law clerk may have, which includes conducting legal research for the judge
and participating in meetings in the judge’s chambers). A law clerk helping a judge is analogous to a
law clerk working for an attorney in a law firm. Compare David J. Richman, How to Be a Great Law Clerk,
AM. B. ASS’N, https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/trial_skills/050510-tipslitigation-law-clerk-career.html (last visited May 29, 2017) (“The best law clerks know how to prepare
their judges for hearings, trials, and oral arguments, and they manage dockets so matters are resolved
timely, thoroughly, and correctly. Law clerks wear many hats—gatekeeper, scheduler, administrator,
writer.”), with Associates and Summer Clerk Program, SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU,
http://www.scmlaw.com/careers/associates-and-summer-clerk-program (last visited May 29, 2017)
(describing the summer clerk program as focusing on “building and fine-tuning writing, analytical[,]
and advocacy skills”).
69. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.12(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“[A] lawyer
shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or law clerk to such a person . . . unless all parties
to the proceeding give informed consent, confirmed in writing.”).
70. See Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524–25 (11th Cir. 1988) (discussing the
grounds for disqualification in the instant case and the impartiality and impropriety concerns thereby
implicated, including: (1) the clerk’s familial relationship with a party’s attorney, which could cause the
party to believe the judge would treat them favorably; (2) the judge gave the clerk credit in a footnote
which could cause the public to believe the clerk decided the case; (3) the appearance of impropriety
resulting from the clerk holding a hearing in the judge’s absence (citing Hunt v. Am. Bank & Tr. Co.,
783 F.2d 1011, 1016 (11th Cir. 1986)).
71. See Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286–87 (1941) (refusing to limit the requirements of a
judge reviewing an application for habeas corpus to what was required at common law or at the time
a statute was originally adopted); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Smolen, 17 P.3d 456, 458–59 (Okla.
2000) (citations omitted) (recognizing an amendment to ABA Model Rule 1.8(e) makes it permissible
for an attorney to condition a client’s repayment of court costs and litigation expenses on the case’s
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conflicts of interest have become outdated and need to make way for new
rules that would apply to the varied roles a person may take in the legal
system.72
III. ANALYSIS
“[A] law clerk who leaves a firm, becomes a lawyer, and joins a different
firm falls between two situations: 1) when a nonlawyer legal assistant moves
from one firm to another, and 2) when a lawyer moves from one firm to
another.”73
A. Current State of the Law
The current legal framework pertaining to former law students’ and
clerks’ conflicts of interest is unclear and varies by jurisdiction. 74 The
majority of jurisdictions follow the ABA rules permitting a firm’s
representation in a matter as long as the attorney is properly screened from
participation.75 The ABA rules make clear that while a student is clerking
outcome, while the previous rule required repayment regardless of any contingency); ANN. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 notes to 2002 and 2009 amendments (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2015)
(explaining the 2002 and 2009 amendments made the rules more liberal for attorneys, and increased
the permissibility of when an attorney might be subject to screening to avoid imputation of the entire
firm).
72. See Audrey I. Benison, Note, The Sophisticated Client: A Proposal for the Reconciliation of Conflicts of
Interest Standards for Attorneys and Accountants, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 699, 700 (2000) (citations
omitted) (“[T]he legal profession is searching for ways to make the traditional rules of ethical lawyering
relevant to modern practice.”).
73. Letter from the Deans of the Law Sch. in the State of Tex., to Mark N. Osborn, Chair, Prof’l
Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Tex. (Apr. 13, 2015) (citing the Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics,
Op. 644, supra note 8), https://law.utexas.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/04/texas-baropinion-644-reconsideration.pdf. The letter describes the Texas law school deans’ unanimous
opposition to this promulgated ethics opinion, and its effects on law students. Letter from the Deans
of the Law Sch. in the State of Tex., supra.
74. Compare COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2014) (permitting a firm to
screen an attorney from a matter in which the attorney’s past law clerk position may conflict with their
new attorney position), with LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 (2016) (remaining silent on the
issue of imputation based on law clerks’ former associations).
75. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (indicating
the rule does not “prohibit representation if the lawyer is prohibited from acting because of events
before the person became a lawyer” but noting the attorney “must [still] be screened from any personal
participation in the matter”). For state rules of professional conduct reflecting the ABA’s approach,
see generally ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (West 2015); ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); ARK. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (West 2015); COLO.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2014); CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 (2016);
DEL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (West 2015); HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (West 2015); IDAHO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (West 2015); ILL. RULES
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for an attorney, the attorney is responsible for the actions of the clerk, and
for other non-attorney professionals who are in their office or under their
supervision.76 This rule specifies the attorney, and not the law clerk, is the
party who owes a duty to the client. 77 As a result of the jurisdictional
variations, there is no uniform law or rule pertaining to former clerks who
are now attorneys.78
Some jurisdictions provide exceptions for law firm imputation as it relates
to a conflict of interest of a lawyer within the firm.79 The Model Rules
OF PROF’L CONDUCT OF 2010 r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4
(2015); IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 32:1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); KY. RULES OF THE SUP. CT.
r. 3.130(1.10) cmt. 4 (2015); ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (West 2015); MD.
LAWYERS’ RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (West 2015); MINN. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (West 2015); MO. SUP. CT. RULES r. 4-1.10 cmt. 4 (West 2015); NEB. CT. R.
OF PROF. COND. § 3-501.10 cmt. 4 (2016); N.H. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2016);
N.M. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 16-110 cmt. 4 (West 2015); N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF’L
COURT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (West 2015); OHIO PROF. COND. RULE 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); OKLA. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); R.I.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 (2016); S.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2014);
S.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2016); UTAH RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10
cmt. 4 (2015); VT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2016); W. VA. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); WIS. SUP. CT. RULES r. 20:1.10 cmt. 4 (2016); WYO. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT FOR ATTY’S AT LAW r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015).
76. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“[A] lawyer having
direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
person’s conflict is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer . . . .”). Most states
follow the rule outlined by the ABA. See Douglas R. Richmond, Watching over, Watching Out: Lawyers’
Responsibilities for Nonlawyer Assistants, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 441, 442 (2012) (“Forty-nine states and the
District of Columbia have adopted Model Rule 5.3 in whole or in part . . . .”); Alphabetical List of States
Adopting Model Rules, supra note 6 (indicating how forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have
adopted a version of ABA Model Rule 5.3).
77. Cf. McCoy, supra note 47, at 738 (“[N]o case or rule indicates whether nonlawyers directly
owe clients a duty of loyalty.”).
78. California, for example, is an outlier when it comes to professional conduct rules because it
has not adopted any portion of the Model Rules. See Sande L. Buhai, Everyone Makes Mistakes: Attorney’s
Fee Recovery in Legal Malpractice Suits, 6 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 32, 37 n.22 (2016)
(citing Status of State Review of Professional Conduct Rules, A.B.A. (Sept. 14, 2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/ethics_2000_status_chart.authch
eckdam.pdf) (showing California did not adopt the Model Rules as of 2011). Compare CAL. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3-310 (2015) (examining conflicts of interest for attorneys, yet failing to mention
the potential conflicts that could arise from work done as a law student), with UTAH RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015) (acknowledging lawyers may be screened from conflicts derived from
their experiences as law clerks).
79. See, e.g., PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10(b) (2016) (excepting strict imputation if the
attorney is properly screened from participation in the matter in which the conflict is present, does not
receive any funds from the client in the conflicted matter, and the firm promptly notifies the client of
the conflict).
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permit an attorney to work for a new firm despite a conflict of interest if
three general requirements are met: (1) the attorney is properly screened
from the case; (2) the attorney receives no portion of the fee the firm derives
from the matter; and (3) the firm timely notifies the client of the conflict,
the screening measures in place, and other available compliance measures.80
States that strictly follow the Model Rules take a more permissive approach
compared to other states.81
B. The Attorney–Client Relationship
An attorney’s duty of loyalty is one of the main reasons an attorney is
precluded from undertaking subsequent representations adverse to a former
client.82 Whether an attorney owes a duty of loyalty is contingent upon
whether an attorney–client relationship exists.83 However, there is a dearth
80. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
81. Compare CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10(a)(2) (2016) (providing an exception to
imputation when proper notice is provided and “the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any
participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom”), and ILL. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT OF 2010 r. 1.10(e) (2015) (allowing the entire firm to avoid imputation by timely screening
the attorney with the conflict and giving the attorney no portion of the fee from the matter), with ALA.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 (2016) (establishing no screening exception for firm imputation
in the case of an attorney’s conflict of interest), and FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-1.10 (2014)
(mandating imputation of an attorney’s conflict of interest to the attorney’s new law firm without an
exception for screening), with GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 (2015) (providing mandatory
imputation rules with no provisions providing for a screening exception).
82. See ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 notes to Para. (a): Lawyer’s Associated
in a Firm (AM. B. ASS’N 2015) (first quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 2 (AM.
B. ASS’N 2013); and then citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“Imputation imposes each individual lawyer’s obligations of client
loyalty upon every lawyer with whom the lawyer is ‘associated in a firm.’”)).
83. See Tessier v. Plastic Surgery Specialists, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 724, 730 (E.D. Va. 1990) (citing
Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1977) (conditioning an attorney’s disqualification upon
the existence of a former attorney–client relationship and on a showing that the current matter is
substantially related to the former representation)); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7
cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s
relationship to a client.”). Compare City of Waukegan v. Martinovich, No. 03 C 3984, 2005 WL
3465567, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2005) (disqualifying an attorney from representing the defendant
based on a finding the attorney had previously served as counsel for the plaintiff in a substantially
related matter), and Stratagene v. Invitrogen Corp., 225 F. Supp. 2d 608, 611 (D. Md. 2002) (finding
disqualification to be merited based on a past attorney–client relationship where an associate attorney
performed work on a patent even though the work only consisted of “administrative tasks”), with City
of Kalamazoo v. Mich. Disposal Serv., 151 F. Supp. 2d 913, 918 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (holding an
attorney–client relationship existed between plaintiff’s counsel and a group of defendants because of
prior representation in a matter that was substantially related to the litigation), and SuperGuide Corp.
v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 616, 622–24 (W.D.N.C. 2001) (disqualifying an attorney who
previously represented the opposing party in litigation and rejecting the attorney’s argument that he
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of information in case law and in academic writings to indicate an attorney–
client relationship exists between a firm’s law clerk and the client it
represents.84
A conflict of interest arises when: (1) there was an attorney–client
relationship with the alleged former client; and (2) “the matter at issue in the
former representation was the same or substantially related to that in the
current action.”85 Accordingly, to determine if a conflict exists, one must
first establish the existence of an attorney–client relationship. 86 This
standard requires representation itself, which may simply include doing
work on a case.87 A clerk might work on part of a case but it is difficult to
argue that a clerk “represents” a client.
Ultimately, an attorney–client relationship does not exist between a clerk
and a firm’s client.88 It also does not arise with other non-attorney legal
workers, such as paralegals or legal assistants.89 These non-attorneys do
not meet the same standards of representation as an attorney.90 Although
was not disqualified since he did not provide legal advice on the contract in dispute), with In re James,
679 S.E.2d 702, 711 (W. Va. 2009) (per curiam) (concluding an attorney–client relationship was not
formed during a meeting in which a victim’s parents did not disclose “any confidential information [to
the attorney] that was not otherwise available”).
84. Cf. McCoy, supra note 47 (“[L]aw clerks and judicial externs neither advocate on behalf of
nor develop attorney–client relationships with litigants.”).
85. Stratagene, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 610; SuperGuide, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 621. It is possible for an
attorney with a conflict of interest to undertake a subsequent representation, but only if the former
client waives the conflict by providing “informed consent, confirmed in writing.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
86. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit provided a standard, which is
facially inapplicable to law clerks, to determine the issue:
[A]n implied attorney–client relationship exists when “[a]n attorney has . . . consented to the
establishment of the attorney–client relationship[,] there is proof of detrimental reliance, [and] the
person seeking legal services reasonably relies on the attorney to provide them and the attorney,
aware of such reliance, does nothing to negate it.”
Rosenbaum v. White, 692 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Douglas v.
Monroe, 743 N.E.2d 1181, 1186 (Ind. App. Ct. 2001)). The rationale laid out by the Seventh Circuit
is not in accord with what a law student does as a law clerk. Id.
87. See Stratagene, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (equating “administrative tasks,” with representation
sufficient to establish an attorney–client relationship since court appearances, consultation, trial
participation, or settlement activities are not required to establish a relationship with a client).
88. See McCoy, supra note 47 (rejecting the notion that a law clerk working for a firm undertakes
an attorney–client relationship or advocacy role on behalf of a client).
89. See Kao, supra note 47 (differentiating between what a paralegal can do for the client and what
an attorney can do by clarifying that “a paralegal may not establish the attorney–client relationship”).
90. See Brown v. Iowa, 152 F.R.D. 168, 172–73 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (indicating the requested
amount of fees was reduced in recognition of the fact that “a law student in a legal clinic . . . is probably
not able to discharge his duties as efficiently as, say, a practicing attorney would have been able to do”).
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clerks and other legal workers may have knowledge relevant to a case, they
do not have the same type of relationship or duty to a client that exists as
an attorney because these nonlawyers are not doing the same work or
carrying the same responsibilities as an attorney.91
A clerk’s inability to enter an attorney–client relationship produces
confounding results for purposes of their subsequent disqualification in
future clerkship positions and in representations upon becoming licensed.
Different states use various standards to determine if a conflict of interest
is present in the absence of an attorney–client relationship.92 While the
Model Rules approach the issue rather leniently, 93 Texas takes a
comparatively strict view of imputation:
[E]ven if the new firm uses a screening process, however, absent consent from
the former employer’s client: “disqualification will always be required under
some circumstances, such as (1) when information relating to the
representation of an adverse client has in fact been disclosed, or (2) when
screening would be ineffective or the nonlawyer necessarily would be required
to work on the other side of a matter that is the same as or substantially related
to a matter on which the nonlawyer has previously worked. Ordinarily,
however, disqualification is not required as long as the ‘practical effect of

91. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123 cmt. f (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (equating law clerks with other non-lawyer employees since they “typically have limited
responsibilities and thus might acquire little sensitive confidential information about matters”); see also
Stewart v. Bee-Dee Neon & Signs, Inc., 751 So. 2d 196, 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (refusing to
apply an automatic disqualification rule to non-lawyers when they are hired by a new firm because
attorneys and non-lawyers are different in reference to their responsibilities, training, and use and
acquisition of confidential information (citing In re Complex Asbestos Litigation, 283 Cal. Rptr. 732,
745 (Dist. Ct. App. 1991))).
92 . Compare In re Am. Home Prods. Corp., 985 S.W.2d 68, 75 (Tex. 1998) (“While the
presumption that a legal assistant obtained confidential information is not rebuttable, the presumption
that information was shared with a new employer may be overcome.”), with Stewart, 751 So. 2d at 206
(citing Smart Indus. Corp., MFG v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 1176, 1182 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)) (“[A]
presumption of ‘shared confidences’ arises upon employment by the hiring firm, which can be rebutted
by establishing that the lawyer or nonlawyer was not privy to the confidences of the former firm’s
client . . . .”).
93. Comment four of Model Rule 1.10 exemplifies this leniency:
The rule . . . does not prohibit representation by others in the law firm where the person
prohibited from involvement in a matter is a nonlawyer . . . . Such persons, however, ordinarily
must be screened from any personal participation in the matter to avoid communication to others
in the firm of confidential information that both the nonlawyers and the firm have a legal duty to
protect.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
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formal screening has been achieved.”94

The Restatement (Second), however, is not as explicit on the matter.
Section 396 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency95 imparts a duty of
confidentiality upon an attorney to their client; it makes no mention of a law
student or a clerk. 96 The requirement in the Restatement pertains to
attorneys who “advise” or “represent” clients.97 The duty of a clerk is not
to advise or represent a client; the role of a clerk is supportive and
observational in nature.98
The duty to advise and represent is the sole responsibility of the attorney
handling the case rather than the clerk.99 A clerk assists the attorney on a
number of matters related to the attorney advising the client, such as
researching a particular area of the law.100 It is neither likely nor ethical that
a firm’s law clerk would ever represent a client in a matter.101 For instance,
while a clerk may draft motions that are submitted to courts, it is the
responsibility of the attorney who is representing a client to review it prior
to its submission.102 The Restatement does mention, however, that it may
94 . In re Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., L.P., 320 S.W.3d 819, 825 (Tex. 2010) (orig.
proceeding) (quoting Phoenix Founders, Inc. v. Marshall, 887 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex. 1994)).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
96. See id. at cmt. i (“An attorney who has been employed to advise, or to represent a client in
actions against others, is not entitled subsequently to advise or represent other clients as to matters in
which a knowledge of the first client’s affairs can be used to his disadvantage.”).
97. Id.
98 . See Summer Program, BAKER BOTTS, http://www.bakerbotts.com/careers/law-students/
summer-program (last visited May 29, 2017) (“Baker Botts’ Summer Associate Program provides real
experience working for the firm’s clients under the supervision of experienced lawyers and with the
support of a strong mentoring program.”).
99. See McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 437 (1988) (declaring an
attorney “has a duty to advise the[ir] client” if the appeal would be frivolous); Johnson v. Commc’ns,
Inc., 660 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding an attorney breached their fiduciary duty by failing “to
advise and represent each client individually, giving due consideration to differing claims, differing
strengths of those claims, and differing interests”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (stating a “lawyer is a fiduciary” to their
client and is “entrusted” with their matters).
100. See McCoy, supra note 47, at 733 (“The major responsibilities of these positions include
research, writing legal memoranda and briefs, drafting motions, and performing important background
functions. As such, law clerks and judicial externs neither advocate on behalf of nor develop attorney–
client relationships with litigants.”).
101. See Wilmington Towing Co. v. Cape Fear Towing Co., 624 F. Supp. 1210, 1212 (E.D.N.C.
1986) (striking an argument for the recusal of a judge where the judge’s son was a summer associate
for a firm representing a party in the case since the summer associate was not employed as an actual
attorney and did not act as an attorney in the matter).
102. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (placing the burden
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be enough that the attorney “acquired confidential information from the
current opponent in litigation.” 103 Arguably, this could mean that an
attorney who gained information as a clerk could be barred from
representation of a client that is opposing the old client’s interests.
C. Clerks
It appears there is only a slight potential for unethical situations to arise
from a law student’s role as a firm’s law clerk.104 While cases implicating
the exact problem tackled in this Comment are rare,105 the ABA addressed
the issue in the commentary for Model Rule 1.10.106
In the case of a potential conflict, an analysis is necessary to determine
exactly what law clerks do during their time at law firms that could give rise
to a later conflict. Does the average clerk actually have access to the
information necessary for a conflict of interest to arise?107 For instance, a
clerk might review discovery or witness a deposition,108 but that does not
on an attorney who supervises a non-lawyer to ensure that the non-lawyer does not violate any
professional obligations); see also Mays v. Neal, 938 S.W.2d 830, 835 (Ark. 1997) (“[The] supervising
attorney . . . has the ultimate responsibility for compliance by the non-lawyer with the applicable
provisions of the Model Rules.”); Disciplinary Counsel v. Blair, 944 N.E.2d 1161, 1166 (Ohio 2011)
(finding the attorney did not properly supervise her non-attorney staff who filed a forged affidavit and
false account in a guardianship proceeding); Richmond, supra note 76, at 446 (“[L]awyers generally
must supervise nonlawyer assistants more closely than they supervise other lawyers because nonlawyer
assistants usually lack formal legal education or training . . . .” (citing Mark L. Tuft, Supervising Offshore
Outsourcing of Legal Services in a Global Environment: Re-examining Current Ethical Standards,
43 AKRON. L. REV. 825, 831 (2010))).
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 8, topic 1, cmt. f (AM.
LAW INST. 2016).
104. See id. (failing to find any reported cases in which a lawyer was disqualified for conflicts
relating to a case they worked on while still a law student).
105. See id. (“Law-student conflicts have not appeared in reported cases.”); see also McCulloch v.
Hartford Life & Accident Ins., No. 3:01CV1115(AHN), 2005 WL 3144656, at *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 23,
2005) (holding no conflict of interest existed where a judicial law clerk assisted the judge with the legal
merits in a case and subsequently accepted a job with a law firm who maintained a client that was a
party to that case).
106. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (discussing
the rules’ application to nonlawyers).
107. See Letter from the Deans of the Law Sch. in the State of Tex., supra note 73 (contending
legal assistants obtain more exposure to confidential information than a firm’s law clerks). “If anything,
a legal assistant—who is a long-term employee—is more likely immersed in a case and exposed to
confidential information than a law clerk—who may work at a firm for a few weeks or a few months.”
Id.
108. See Summer Associates, SKADDEN RECRUITING, http://recruit.skadden.com/law-studentsgraduates/united-states/summer-associates/ (last visited May 29, 2017) (explaining summer associates
are given the opportunity to learn first-hand about the firm’s practices, which includes, among other
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necessarily mean the clerk knows the trial strategy the attorney intends to
employ to effectively use that information to the client’s detriment.109 It is
improper to assume that a clerk received confidential information to the
extent that it would create a conflict of interest for a future firm they may
work for.110 Thus, the basic question to be answered is what access to or
knowledge of sensitive client information does a clerk actually have that
would require the law to treat law clerks differently than other non-attorney
legal professionals?
Some duties of a clerk—such as drafting motions 111 —involve
information that is open to the public.112 When a motion is submitted to
a court, the information contained therein becomes public and would not
give rise to a conflict of interest if the law clerk drafted it.113 Other duties
may similarly involve public information and it is faulty to assume a clerk
has access to damaging, confidential information when there is no clear
evidence that this sort of conflict is occurring frequently.114
D. Judicial Clerks
The question of conflicts of interest as applied to clerks has arisen in the
context of judicial officials and their respective law clerks. “[A] lawyer shall
not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer
participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative
officer or law clerk to such a person . . . .”115 It is relevant to compare a
judicial clerkship to other positions that a law student might possess or from
which a conflict of interest could later arise. A judicial law clerk performs
similar types of research that a law clerk for an attorney might do but the
things, sitting in on client meetings and attending depositions).
109. Cf. Letter from the Deans of the Law Sch. in the State of Tex., supra note 73 (“[M]any
experienced and highly trained legal assistants better recognize the usefulness of certain former client
information and are better able to apply that knowledge than many law clerks who are still students.”).
110. See id. (comparing the role of a law clerk to the role of a legal assistant in terms of the tasks
they perform and the amount of confidential information they are exposed to).
111 . See McCoy, supra note 47 (listing drafting motions as one of a clerk’s potential
responsibilities).
112. See, e.g., PACER, https://www.pacer.gov (providing public access to court electronic records)
(last visited May 29, 2017).
113. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“Information
that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not
be disqualifying.”).
114. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 8, topic 1, cmt. f
(AM. LAW INST. 2016) (describing the incidence of law firm imputation for conflicts that manifest from
work done while a lawyer was still in law school and finding no reported cases adjudicating this topic).
115. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.12(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
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judicial clerk does it in a different capacity.116 A judicial clerk serves as an
“extension” of the judge117 similar to how a clerk functions as an extension
of an attorney.118 The duty of loyalty seems even more important in the
context of adjudicatory officials and their law clerks because a judge’s duty
is owed to the court and the public at large, as opposed to an individual
client.119 Therefore, it is notable that a firm can screen former adjudicatory
law clerks to avoid imputation of the entire firm despite the fact that an
adjudicatory clerk likely knows information about cases that could be
privileged.120
E. Other Nonlawyer Professionals
Other professionals in the legal industry are not subject to the same strict
rules and professional standards that apply to attorneys. A paralegal or a
legal secretary is provided more leeway when changing employment, and
there is some expectation of mobility between firms.121
Many jurisdictions permit non-attorney legal professionals to use
screening procedures when they move to a new firm that represents a client
116. Similar to law clerks at a firm, a judicial clerk does not have exceptional access to work
product that could be used against an opposing firm’s client. See Olivia v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 40
(2d Cir. 1988) (“[A] law clerk generally performs discretionary acts of a judicial nature.”); Freedonia
Broad. Corp. v. RCA Corp., 569 F.2d 251, 255–56 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The law clerk has no statutorily
defined duties but rather performs a broad range of functions to assist his judge.”), disavowed on other
grounds by Riquelme Valdes v. Leisure Res. Grp., Inc., 810 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1987); Bishop v.
Albertson’s, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 897, 900 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (“[I]t is the law clerk who assists the [c]ourt
in defining issues and locating authorities which have eluded counsel.”).
117. See Olivia, 670 F. Supp. at 526, aff’d, 839 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Law clerks are simply
extensions of the judges at whose pleasure they serve.”).
118. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (requiring attorneys
to ensure that the non-lawyers under their supervision comply with the ethical responsibilities of the
legal profession).
119. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 164–65 (1990) (“Legislation designed to prohibit
and to avoid potential conflicts of interest in the performance of governmental service is supported by
the legitimate interest in maintaining the public’s confidence in the integrity of the federal service.”);
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins., 343 F.3d 120, 128–29 (2d Cir. 2003) (identifying how a
judge’s financial stake in a case, with even one share in a company, is a disqualifying conflict of interest
because the public’s confidence in the judiciary must be protected); Rodriguez v. Dist. Court for City
& Cty. of Denver, 719 P.2d 699, 706 (Colo. 1986) (“In some circumstances, fundamental
considerations other than a defendant’s interest in retaining a particular attorney are deemed of
controlling significance. These considerations relate to the paramount necessity of preserving public
confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice.”).
120. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.12(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
121. See id. at r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (“The rule . . . does not prohibit representation by others in the law
firm where the person prohibited from involvement in a matter is a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or
legal secretary.”).
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adverse to the interests of their old firm’s client. 122 This rule is not
absolute, although the Model Rules may have intended it to be.123 Some
courts have held that where a paralegal or legal secretary had to perform a
sufficiently large quantity of work, even screening measures could not
overcome the conflict of interest that was counter to the former client’s
interests.124
A clerk’s role and work are similar to that of a paralegal or a legal
secretary.125 A clerk does not actually represent a client, but rather assists
an attorney who represents the client.126 Only a licensed attorney, and not
any other employee of a law office, owes a duty of loyalty to a client because
the attorney is the party who is ultimately responsible for the actions of the
non-attorneys. 127 A non-attorney owes a duty of loyalty to their
122. Compare MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015) (allowing law firms to
use screening measures as a way of mitigating the risk that confidential or sensitive information could
be revealed), N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015) (granting law firms the
ability to employ screening measures for a new staff–member who previously worked for opposing
counsel as a paralegal or legal secretary), and OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015)
(accepting a paralegal or legal secretary may be screened as a way to avoid disclosure for sensitive
information gained during a previous employment), with N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10
cmt. 4 (2015) (endorsing the idea that a non-attorney staff member of a firm may be properly screened
to avoid conflict of interest issues but not conceding that this necessarily extends to law students).
123. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2013) (indicating the imputation rule does not apply to “representation by others in the law firm
where the person prohibited from involvement in a matter is a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or legal
secretary”).
124 . See Grant v. Thirteenth Court of Appeals, 888 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1994) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) (holding disqualification of the entire firm was proper where a non-attorney
worked extensively on a case by interviewing clients, overseeing medical appointments, and preparing
investigative reports for the firm at the non-attorney’s former firm and was not adequately screened at
the new firm initially); see also Green v. Toledo Hosp., 764 N.E.2d 979, 983 (Ohio 2002) (determining
conflict of interest for a non-attorney requires the court to make a finding that the non-attorney was
exposed to confidential information based on credible evidence and not the mere fact the non-attorney
worked on the case).
125. The duties of a law student clerking in a firm are similar to a paralegal’s duties as law clerks
also frequently perform legal research and draft documents for an attorney. See Barbara Berry, Typical
Paralegal Duties, CAREER CHRON., at 22–38 (2008), https://www.nala.org/sites/default/files/2009-ffjob-descriptions.pdf (compiling a list of duties and roles a paralegal or legal assistant performs, and
showing their duties can be complex and varied with responsibilities ranging from drafting documents
to participating in client interviews). See generally Letter from the Deans of the Law Sch. in the State of
Tex., supra note 73 (comparing the roles of law clerks and legal assistants).
126. See Estate of Divine v. Giancola (In re Estate of Divine), 635 N.E.2d 581, 587–88 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994) (observing a paralegal or law clerk is not held to the same standards as an attorney because a
paralegal is an assistant to the attorney and is not the one practicing law or owing a duty to a client).
127. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (promulgating the
idea that attorneys are responsible for the actions of the non-attorney staff members they supervise).
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supervising attorney because of the rules of agency,128 but not because of
any specific duty the non-attorney owes to a client.129
F. Economic Effects
Law firms hiring new attorneys should be aware of the potential for
imputation of new attorneys because of a conflict of interest. Accordingly,
the law firm will need to conduct an economic analysis to determine if it is
financially sound to hire the new attorney who could possibly cause the
entire firm to lose a client.130
Imagine a scenario where a law student clerks for Exxon Mobil within
their in-house counsel department. That student would be exposed to a
wide range of legal issues and areas of law that will benefit the student’s
professional development, as well as any firm that chooses to hire the
student in the future. However, hiring a new attorney who clerked for
Exxon as a law student would not make sense from a financial perspective
since that could subsequently limit the firm’s ability to pursue litigation
against Exxon—the world’s largest oil and gas company.131 As a result,
entire areas of law could suffer from a deprivation of experience, as well as
decrease the potential for firms to engage in litigation with certain
companies due to conflicts imputed from whom they have hired.132
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
129. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (stating communications between a client or prospective client and their lawyer or agents
of either the lawyer or client are privileged); Fortney & Hanna, supra note 45, at 683 (“As agents of the
law firm, legal assistants must conform to the same ethical obligations as the firm.” (first citing Jett
Hanna, Moonlighting Law Professors: Identifying and Minimizing the Professional Liability Risk, 42 S. Tex. L.
Rev. 421, 439–41 (2001); and then citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 70 (2000))); see also In re Estate of Divine, 635 N.E.2d at 588 (concluding it would be
inappropriate to hold a paralegal responsible to the same extent as an attorney because it is inconsistent
with the theory of respondeat superior, and noting “paralegals do not independently practice law, but
simply serve as assistants to lawyers”); Carstensen v. Chrisland Corp., 442 S.E.2d 660, 668–69
(Va. 1994) (“The existence of an attorney–client relationship is essential to establishing a claim of legal
malpractice . . . . An attorney–client relationship cannot be created by a non-attorney acting as an
attorney.”).
130. See Ward Bower, Fine-Tuning Your Firm’s Economics, OR. ST. B. BULL., Oct. 1994, at 17, 19
(“[A] partner or committee should work with the . . . office manager/administrator to conduct the
[economic] analysis and prepare a report, selling forth recommended strategies and tactics for
improvement of profitability . . . [because] a thorough economic analysis is an investment every firm
should make in its future.”).
131 . Lauren Gensler, The World’s Largest Oil and Gas Companies 2016: Exxon is Still King,
FORBES (May 26, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurengensler/2016/05/26/global-2000worlds-largest-oil-and-gas-companies/#784628c18d9e.
132. For example, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed a lower court’s decision to disqualify a
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Adding to that detriment, an expansion of the conflict of interest rules
could also adversely affect the manner in which many law firms hire new
attorneys. Because a clerk’s pipeline begins as a law student,133 law firms
may need to consider a law clerk’s prior summer associations and
employment before extending an employment offer to a law student.134
Law firms rely on clerks to perform valuable legal research that firms are
otherwise unable to conduct135 because a clerk can perform the kind of indepth analysis an attorney may not have the time to complete due to their
own workload. Thus, clerks’ work may be highly beneficial to firms.
Accordingly, any limitation on the employment of clerks is detrimental to
both clerks and the firms who benefit from their work.
G. Educational Effects
States should be cautious not to create disincentives for law students to
pursue clerkships with law firms. In addition to the aforementioned
reasons, practical work experience is invaluable to a law student’s future
success.136 It is unreasonable to handicap law students’ career prospects
firm from continuing its representation of a client since a legal secretary the firm hired had a conflict
of interest. See generally Zimmerman v. Mahaska Bottling Co., 19 P.3d 784 (Kan. 2001). The court did
not permit a screening exception for non-lawyers and concluded, “The need for confidentiality, the
trust of the client, and the public’s respect for the legal system all support the rule in Kansas prohibiting
the use of screening devices.” Id. at 793.
133 . See Shawn P. O’Connor, Make the Most of Your First Law School Summer, U.S. NEWS
(May 6, 2013, 10:00 PM), https://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/law-admissions-lowdown/
2013/05/06/make-the-most-of-your-first-law-school-summer (“As you explore your 1L summer
options, keep in mind that your 2L summer internship could result in a job offer for after graduation.”);
see also Kevin Winters, A Time for Talent Spotting, J.L. SOC’Y OF SCOT. (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/58-9/1013030.aspx (showing the prevalence of recruiting
future attorneys from summer internships).
134. See Letter from the Deans of the Law Sch. in the State of Tex., supra note 73 (arguing against
an ethics opinion that would support a ban on screening conflicts from the time a lawyer was in law
school, and stating the measure would harm young lawyers because a firm would potentially not hire
the lawyer when “they otherwise would”).
135. See Former Emps. of Tyco Elecs., Fiber Optics Div. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 350 F. Supp. 2d
1075, 1092 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004) (awarding fees charged for work, including research, performed by
summer associates and paralegals at market rate); Summer Associates Program Overview, COVINGTON &
BURLING LLP, https://www.cov.com/en/careers/lawyers/summer-associates (last visited May 29,
2017) (“We also help summer associates develop their writing, research, and advocacy skills as the
summer progresses.”).
136. As a law clerk, a law student gains insight into different areas of the law, as well as the
beneficial insight of what it is like to work in a law firm. See New York Summer Program,
BAKERHOSTETLER, https://www.bakerlaw.com/careers/lawstudents/summerassociateprograms/n
ewyork (last visited May 29, 2017) (“Summer associates gain valuable, firsthand experience at
BakerHostetler. Our program is designed to provide a realistic view of life as an associate at the firm,
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with overbearing rules that limit the potential to gain real-world experience
in a professional legal setting.
H. Clerk Experience
A clerk’s work encounters vary depending on the type of firm the clerk
joins and the clerk’s supervising attorney. 137 The type of experiences
gained shapes whether a conflict of interest actually exists, and if it does,
what steps are necessary to avoid the likelihood of exposing confidential or
sensitive information the clerk obtained.138
A clerk may be asked to perform an assortment of tasks during his tenure
at a firm such as crafting a legal memorandum on a complex legal issue, or
as broad in scope as reading through pages of discovery to find information
useful to a case. 139 Additionally, a clerk might attend meetings with
attorneys and their clients where important strategy is being discussed.140
Since clerks’ roles vary, it is difficult to determine precisely what a clerk is
exposed to that creates a conflict of interest. A memorandum analyzing
legal research is unlikely to give rise to a conflict, but awareness of trial
working alongside teams of partners and associates on a variety of billable and pro bono assignments
across many practice areas.”). Additionally, the ABA recognizes experiential learning as an important
and beneficial method of seeing an authentic variety of legal work by encouraging law students to gain
experience and requiring law schools to include practical learning opportunities, such as clerkships, law
clinics, or externship programs, in their curriculum to gain accreditation. AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, at 16–18 (2015–2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/201
5_2016_aba_standards_for_approval_of_law_schools_final.authcheckdam.pdf (requiring accredited
law schools to provide opportunities for experiential learning through programs such as clerkships or
externships); see also Brian Sites, Experiential Learning: ABA Standards 303 and 304, BEST PRACS. FOR
LEGAL EDUC. (Sept. 13, 2015), http://bestpracticeslegaled.albanylawblogs.org/2015/09/13/
experiential-learning-aba-standards-303-and-304/ (acknowledging law clinics and field placements are
“[t]wo well-known ways to meet the [ABA’s experiential learning] requirement[,]” both of which are
already widely offered in law schools throughout the country).
137. See Eric Thiergood, How to Get the Most Out of Your Law Clerk: A Law Clerk’s Perspective, HOUS.
LAW., Nov.–Dec. 2005, at 43, 43–44, http://www.thehoustonlawyer.com/aa_nov05/page42.htm
(“The range of law clerks’ job duties can vary from administrative roles to significant law-related
duties.”).
138 . Law clerks and legal assistants perform similar tasks—research, discovery, and case
preparation—all of which may provide them with “access to similar sorts of confidential information.”
Letter from the Deans of the Law Sch. in the State of Tex., supra note 73.
139. See O’Connor, supra note 133 (“Before accepting a 1L summer associate position, ensure
that you will have the opportunity to contribute in a meaningful way, such as by conducting legal
research and drafting motions, orders[,] or memos under the supervision of an attorney.”).
140. See Summer Associate Program, TROUTMAN SANDERS, http://www.troutmansanders.com/
laterals/summer_program/ (last visited May 29, 2017) (“Our summer associates work on real projects
for real clients. They meet with clients and attend strategy sessions and closings.”).
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strategy surely would.141 This uncertainty makes it difficult to create brightline rules that would apply to clerks that are now attorneys. Clerks’ work
does not often expose them to the kind of confidential information that
would benefit another party in the case; thus, a bright-line rule that would
forbid a former law clerk from representing an opposing party of his former
firm’s client would not fit many of the situations the rule would be designed
to protect against.
The likelihood that that this issue will arise in the real world must also be
considered. Admittedly, it is foreseeable enough for the ABA to discuss it
in the comments to the Model Rules142 and for the Texas Committee on
Professional Ethics to write an opinion on the topic (twice).143 Although
it will depend on a number of factors,144 the likelihood an attorney will
work on a case they also worked on as a clerk may be small.145 Case law
on this specific issue is scant,146 thus implying that, in all probability, there
are a minimal number of attorneys affected by any information they may
have obtained while formerly employed as a law clerk at a firm.
Despite the lack of case law on this specific issue, many states have
addressed the topic by adopting the language of the Model Rules into their
141 . See Carreno v. City of Newark, 834 F. Supp. 2d 217, 223–24 (D.N.J. 2011) (hearing
arguments that the plaintiff-attorney’s knowledge of trial strategies from past representation of the
defendant warrants a conflict of interest disqualification); see also Steel v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
912 F. Supp. 724, 739–40 (D.N.J. 1995) (holding disclosure of trial strategy, even when generally
known by other attorneys, is grounds for disqualification because it may “create . . . an ‘appearance of
impropriety’” (quoting N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (2015))). But see Holloway v. Arkansas,
435 U.S. 475, 491 (1978) (“[T]o assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney’s options,
tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. Thus, an inquiry into a claim
of harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation.”).
142. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (AM. B. ASS’N 2013)
(discussing imputation of conflicts of interest and the availability of screening mechanisms as it pertains
to non-lawyers).
143. Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 644 Revised, supra note 12, at 609.
144. See Ellen Yankiver Suni, Conflicts of Interest, 2005 A.B.A. SOLO, SMALL FIRM & GEN. PRAC.
DIVISION 7, http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_
solo_magazine_index/conflictsofinterest.html (“The extent to which lawyers will confront potential
conflicts of interest is influenced by the size, type, and location of the practice. For example, lawyers
in specialized practice areas . . . or practicing in small towns are more susceptible to conflicts owing to
the interrelationships among their constituencies.”).
145. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123 note f (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (“Law students who clerk in firms, like other nonlawyer employees, typically have limited
responsibilities and thus might acquire little sensitive confidential information about matters.”). See
also Suni, supra note 144 (listing and discussing factors that will influence whether attorneys will face
potential conflicts).
146. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123 note f (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (“Law-student conflicts have not appeared in reported cases.”).
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respective state rules of professional conduct.147 The states which decline
to adopt a provision for attorneys to avoid their firm’s imputation based off
of work they did as law students fail to follow the majority rule, and these
outliers may see an increasing number of firms subjected to imputed
disqualification or find law students experiencing difficulty securing
employment based on a past association.148
I.

The Interests of the Client
When analyzing the effects a new or proposed rule will have on law firms
or attorneys, it is important to consider the ethics rules’ primary
purpose149—to protect the interests of the client.150 Accordingly, it is
147 . See DEL. LAWYERS’ RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015) (allowing for
screening mechanisms to be used for a lawyer’s conflict that arose from their time as a law student);
HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015) (recognizing screening of lawyers is permitted
to avoid imputation of conflicts that originate from experience they gained while still a law student);
ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT OF 2010 r. 1.10 cmt 4 (2015) (granting a method for firms to avoid
imputed disqualification because of an attorney’s conflict manifesting from when the attorney was a
law student); PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015) (indicating the rules do not
“prohibit representation if the lawyer is prohibited from acting because of events before the person
became a lawyer, for example, work that the person did while a law student”).
148. The majority rule, based upon the ABA rule, permits screening of a lawyer whose conflict
arises from their experience prior to becoming a lawyer. See CPR Policy Implementation Committee,
Variations of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.10, A.B.A. (Jan. 5, 2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_1
_10.authcheckdam.pdf (listing variations of the rule of imputation); see also CAL. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 3-310 (2015) (providing no guidance as to what firms should do in a conflict of interest
situation with a new attorney whose conflict arises from experience prior to becoming an attorney);
N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 (2015) (promulgating imputation rules but failing to make
any mention of conflicts a lawyer may have from the time he was still in law school). The states that
have not adopted the ABA’s version of the rule are some of the largest and most populist states, and
thus these outliers represent a substantial portion of the country. See id. (demonstrating California,
New York, and Texas have not adopted Model Rule 1.10 or its comments); Sumit Passary, U.S.
Population Grows to 320.09 Million, TECH TIMES (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/
23784/20141230/u-s-population-grows-to-320-09-million-california-still-reigns-as-most-populousus-state.htm (indicating California is the most populous state, with Texas following in second place
and New York in fourth).
149. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 13(AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“Lawyers play
a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by
lawyers of their relationship to our legal system. The Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly
applied, serve to define that relationship.”); see also TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT
pmbl. ¶ 1 (“Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society. The
fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship with and function in
our legal system. A consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical
conduct.”).
150. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“The guiding
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important to consider the question or issue from the perspective of what a
client would want or how a client may feel if they were aware that a conflict
of interest arose in their case.151 We must ask, in this scenario, how a client
may feel if they knew that a law student who knows details about their case
because the law student previously worked for the attorney representing
them is now working for the opposing party. The answer to this question,
in conjunction with the aforementioned factors, must guide the decisions of
those who craft and distribute ethics rules. The ethics rules generated need
consider the perspective of the client, the practical factors of legal training,
and the nature of the profession as a whole. Conflict of interest rules should
not be so burdensome as to make it impractical for lawyers to operate after
they graduate from law school, but should always strive to protect the
clients’ interests.
IV. PROPOSAL
To avoid these problems, one alternative solution is to seek a waiver of a
conflict from the opposing counsel and party.152 In an effort to work out
issues that may arise, attorneys often contact one another prior to actually
litigating the case.153 Furthermore, a former client may waive a conflict of
principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with
the duty to act in the client’s best interests . . . .”); Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646, 653 (Wash. 1992)
(explaining ethics rules protect the interests of the public, as well as “the integrity of the profession”);
Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So. 2d 1242, 1244–45 (Miss. 1991) (illustrating the different duties a lawyer
owes to his client, namely the duty of care and the duty of loyalty); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing an attorney’s “sole” duty is to protect his client);
see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1246 (1991) (“The duties
of loyalty and confidentiality legitimate the representation of clients, including business clients.”). An
attorney’s ultimate goal is to further the client’s interests, even if those interests are contrary to the
attorney’s interests (including a new lawyer’s interest in their future) or the business prospects of a law
firm. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“A lawyer must
also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon
the client’s behalf.”).
151. See Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating a
client will not disclose information to an attorney they do not trust and especially will not trust entire
firms that nimbly switch sides in a case); Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Rests., Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 172
(5th Cir. 1979) (“A client would feel wronged if an opponent prevailed against him with the aid of an
attorney who formerly represented the client in the same matter.”); see also State v. Carmouche,
508 So. 2d 792, 803 (La. 1987) (“Even while the issue [of a conflict of interest] is being raised before
the trial judge, the attorney must be wary not to betray the confidences that may underlie his conflict.”).
152. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (providing
the opportunity for waiver as long as it is not prohibited by the rules and informed consent is given in
writing).
153. See United States v. Brown, 202 F.3d 691, 697–98 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding a waiver of
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interest.154 A waiver helps avoid any surprises that counsel may be subject
to once attorneys begin litigating a case.155
However, notwithstanding a waiver signed by clients, attorneys can still
be held responsible by their respective state bar for violating professional
rules and ethical duties.156 In addition to disqualification, the attorney may
be subject to various forms of discipline from his state bar, including
suspension. 157 Attorneys should consult their jurisdiction’s ethics rules
before making any decisions regarding a waiver of a conflict of interest.
The stronger alternative solution is for ethics rules to provide uniformity
in resolving this issue. Law firms should not be subject to strict imputation
based on a lawyer’s participation in a matter while they served as a clerk
during law school.158 Ethics rules should uniformly allow for permissive
screening of lawyers who may have conflicts based on past law firm
clerkships, as the states that follow the example of the Model Rules have
done.159

conflict of interest is appropriate as long as the client has “knowledge of the crux of the conflict” and
they comprehend the “implications” of the waiver); see also Kratsas v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 2d
320, 326–27 (D. Md. 2000) (deciding the pre-trial waiver of conflicts between the attorney and a witness
was valid, and noting despite the waiver there was no conflict present).
154. See United States v. Greig, 967 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1992) (“For a waiver to be effective,
the record must show that the trial court determined that it was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
done . . . .”). But see United States v. Abner, 825 F.2d 835, 845–46 (5th Cir. 1987) (determining waiver
of the right to object to a conflict of interest is allowed but was not done in the proper manner in this
case because it failed to address the counsel’s personal interest in the outcome of the case); and Edward
L. Wilkinson, Conflicts of Interest in Texas Criminal Cases, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 171, 216 (2002)
(commenting on courts’ “latitude” in refusing a waiver of conflicts even if the client “knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily waived a conflict of interest”).
155. See Raspberry v. State, 741 S.W.2d 191, 196 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, pet. ref’d)
(agreeing a surprise conflict of interest occurred during the trial because of a witness, although it did
not reach to a level of prejudice against the defendant).
156. Compare In re Ockrassa, 799 P.2d 1350, 1354 (Ariz. 1990) (filing a complaint against an
attorney for a conflict of interest caused the State Bar of Arizona to suspend him for violating ethics
rules), with Owens v. State, 357 S.W.3d 792, 794–95 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d)
(concluding the mere filing of a grievance against an attorney with the State Bar does not create grounds
for an ethical violation such as a conflict of interest).
157. See In re Conduct of Wittemyer, 980 P.2d 148, 155–57 (Or. 1998) (discussing the suspension
sanction on the attorney was appropriate because “[he] violated his duty to his clients to avoid conflicts
of interest”).
158. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N. 2013) (permitting
a firm to screen an attorney from conflicts arising from work performed while they were in law school).
159. See ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015) (allowing for screening in
situations where a conflict arises from work performed prior to becoming an attorney); IND. RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015) (giving law firms the ability to screen attorneys to avoid
imputation when the attorney’s conflict arises from experience gained while a law student).
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There should not be a conclusive presumption that a clerk substantially
gained knowledge that would serve as insight into the mental processes of
the opposing attorney.160 Screening is a widely accepted method in many
jurisdictions for limiting the effect of nonlawyers’ potential conflicts when
they move from one firm to another.161 It is unlikely that a non-attorney
clerk would gain such substantial insight into an opposing party’s confidential
information 162 that any conflict thus presented could not be solved by
screening process, as is done with paralegals or legal assistants.163
Screening is a strong start to preventing the transfer of sensitive
information about a past client.164 While the rules should permit screening,
they must also account for what is best for a client and how a client would
feel if their attorney betrayed their trust.165 Accordingly, bright-line ethics
160. See Petrol. Wholesale, Inc. v. Marshall, 751 S.W.2d 295, 300 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, writ
denied) (indicating one of the presumptions that gives rise to vicarious disqualification is “an
irrebuttable presumption that a client gives confidential information to an attorney actively handling
the client’s case” (citing In re Corrugated Container Litig., 659 F.2d 1341, 1347 (5th Cir. 1981))).
161. See generally ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015) (permitting screening
measures for non-attorney professionals such as paralegals or secretaries, in addition to lawyers whose
conflicts manifest from work they performed while a law student); COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015) (allowing a non-attorney professional to be screened to prevent firm-wide
imputation of the conflict); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT OF 2010 r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015) (granting
firms the ability to screen non-attorney employees, including lawyers whose conflict arises from work
they did while in law school). But see N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015) (giving
law firms the ability to screen out non-attorney staff such as paralegals, but not including lawyers whose
conflicts emanate from work done while still in law school).
162. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123 cmt. f (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (considering the potential risk of a law clerk transmitting confidential information to an
opposing firm and concluding there is little risk because non-lawyers understand less than lawyers
when it comes to “the legal significance of information they learn”).
163. See id. (“Law students who clerk in firms, like other nonlawyer employees, typically have
limited responsibilities and thus might acquire little sensitive confidential information about matters.
Absent special circumstances, they should be considered nonlawyer employees for the purposes of
[imputation.]”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)
(permitting screening for a non-attorney staff member such as a paralegal or legal assistant).
164. See Hodge v. UFRA-Sexton, LP, 758 S.E.2d 314, 320 (Ga. 2014) (“[O]ur Rules recognize
that screening is effective at protecting a client’s confidences.”); Leibowitz v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. of
Nev., 78 P.3d 515, 520 (Nev. 2003) (“[T]he majority of professional legal ethics commentators, ethics
tribunals, and courts have concluded that nonlawyer screening is a permissible method to protect
confidences held by nonlawyer employees who change employment.”).
165. See Interview with Jonathan Smaby, Exec. Dir., Tex. Ctr. for Legal Ethics, in Austin, Tex.
(Nov. 19, 2015) (“Where a law clerk could potentially make a client feel betrayed . . . then the
profession has to address that . . . .”); see also Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950, 955 (Cal. 1994)
(emphasizing the client is not likely to feel comfortable or trusting in a situation where an attorney is
representing him while also representing the opposing client in a completely unrelated matter, and
most clients would not want to continue the representation).
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rules are not the best solution to this ethical issue. Rather, screening should
merely be presumed to constitute a reasonable method of preventing a clerk
from discussing or sharing any confidential information he may possess.
Technology may aid in implementing this solution or at least help
minimize the problem’s occurrence. 166 As time progresses and firms
continue to modernize their practices, managing attorneys should place
greater emphasis on limiting the potentially conflicted involvement of
attorneys. With the aid of technological advances, an attorney with no
involvement in a case should be prohibited from electronically accessing
files that he or she has no authority or reason to access.167 Screening would
be a more trusted and viable option in combatting conflicts of interest if
there was a data or electronic trail a firm could show to a court if
employment of a new attorney is challenged. This would enable a firm to
present a paper trail evidencing the new attorney never accessed the
implicated information, as well as demonstrating that the new attorney was
prohibited from discussing anything about the case at hand with the rest of
the firm.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no consensus for how states should treat a lawyer who has a
conflict that arises from the time when the attorney was still in law school
and working as a clerk.168 The majority of states permit a lawyer to be
screened if there is a conflict manifesting from work they performed when
they were still in law school. 169 However, other states—specifically
166. See Kevin Hopkins, Law Firms, Technology, and the Double-Billing Dilemma, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 95, 95–96 (1998) (discussing the likelihood of technology changing the manner in which firms
conduct business and handle information).
167. See Nate Lord, Law Firm Data Security: Experts on How to Protect Legal Clients’ Confidential Data,
DIGITAL GUARDIAN, https://digitalguardian.com/blog/law-firm-data-security-experts-how-protectlegal-clients-confidential-data (last visited May 29, 2017) (compiling the opinions of lawyers with
expertise in the area of data protection, including one lawyer’s statement: “[Y]ou never know when a
conflict of interest may arise or an employee may go rogue . . . . [Therefore,] you need to be able to
track who has access to what information.”).
168. Compare N.M. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 16-110 cmt. 4 (2015) (permitting screening
for an attorney’s conflict that arises from when they were still in law school), with N.Y. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 (2015) (failing to state any particular rule that would pertain to a conflict
stemming from the time a lawyer was in law school).
169. ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); ARK. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); COLO.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4
(2015); DEL. LAWYERS’ RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); HAW. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); IDAHO COURT RULES r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L
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California and New York—are silent on the issue in their professional
conduct rules.170
The benefits of clerking for a law firm are vast.171 A law student gains
experience in a law practice as opposed to only gaining classroom
experience.172 They get hands-on experience by conducting research and
writing motions for actual cases, and law firms benefit from this extra
help.173 A law firm might also use a clerkship as a method of determining
if a law student would be a good fit to hire as an attorney upon graduation
and bar passage.174 Therefore, if firms or students limit these experiences
because of the fear of subsequent imputed disqualification, the entire legal
industry will suffer from the loss of students’ educational opportunities
through experiential learning and the absence of extra hands at law firms.
During these educational opportunities, no attorney–client relationship is
created between a firm’s clerk and the clients the firm represents.175 While
CONDUCT OF 2010 r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015);
IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 32:1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); KY. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 3.130
(1.10) cmt. 4 (2015); ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); MD. LAWYERS’ RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015);
MO. SUP. CT. RULES r. 4-1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); NEB. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 3-501.10 cmt. 4
(2015); N.H. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); N.M. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 16-100 cmt. 4; N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); OHIO RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); PA.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); R.I. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4
(2015); S.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); S.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); UTAH RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); VT. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); W. VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); WIS.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS r. 20:1.10 cmt. 4 (2015); WYO. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS AT LAW r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (2015).
170. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3-310 (2015); N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 1.10.
171. See O’Connor, supra note 133 (encouraging students to find summer positions that will
enable them to “hone the relevant skills to be successful in the long term”). For example, real world
experience “provides a unique and invaluable method of teaching students ethical behavior.” McCoy,
supra note 47, at 735 (citing David R. Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its Theory and
Implementation, 30 J. Legal Educ. 67, 73 (1979)).
172 . Cf. McCoy, supra note 47, at 735 (recognizing the ethical lessons students gain from
partaking in student practice in clinical education and indicating students choose to engage in these
activities to develop legal skills and gain advocacy experience).
173. See id. at 734 (describing a few of the duties of a law clerk in a firm (citing Kovac, supra
note 53, at 698–700)).
174. See O’Connor, supra note 133 (advising law students to be aware that a summer experience
with a firm after their second year of law school could lead to an offer for employment upon
graduation).
175. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123 cmt. f (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (indicating a former law student now attorney should be treated as a non-attorney for

2017]

COMMENT

411

a clerk may work directly with clients, the clerk only owes a duty to the
lawyer or firm he is working for under the law of agency (not through any
duty of loyalty, which is reserved for the attorney–client relationship).176 A
lawyer and a clerk do not hold the same roles and should not be treated in
the same manner.
Clerks often perform work that would not otherwise lead to a conflict, or
they may not fully understand the legal implications of what they are
observing.177 It is less likely for a lawyer to disclose information obtained
while still in law school than for a lawyer to disclose information obtained
when the lawyer simply moved from one firm to another.178
For these reasons, it is necessary to implement a change in the ethical
approach to a clerk’s conflicts of interest. Screening is already permitted for
other non-attorney staff members in a law firm.179 The roles of a paralegal
or legal assistant are similar to the role of a clerk.180 If states allow a nonattorney to be screened to avoid imputation, then an analogous role—such
as a clerk—should also be permitted to be screened.
Ethics rules protect the interests of the client, and allow public confidence
to be instilled in the judicial system.181 Consideration must be given to how
a client would feel if she knew someone who had worked on her case was
now working for the opposing law firm. It would be understandable if the
client felt betrayed, so ethics rules should be empathetic to such legitimate
concerns.182
A client can waive a conflict of interest from an opposing firm.183 That
purposes of conflicts arising from clerkships since they have fewer responsibilities and are less likely
to acquire sensitive information).
176. See Fortney & Hanna, supra note 45, at 682–83 (classifying a non-attorney as an agent of the
firm); McCoy, supra note 47, at 734 (indicating law clerks working for a law firm do not develop
attorney–client relationships with clients).
177. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123 cmt. f (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (discussing the potential risk of a law clerk disclosing confidential information).
178. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124 cmt. d(ii) (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (“Screening must assure that confidential client information will not pass from the
personally prohibited lawyer to any other lawyer in the firm.”).
179. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
180. See In re Estate of Divine, 635 N.E.2d at 588 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (articulating a paralegal is
not the party who is held to the strict standards because the paralegal is assisting the attorney who is
ultimately responsible).
181. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (stressing the
importance of “commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with a zeal in
advocacy . . . ”).
182. See Interview with Jonathan Smaby, supra note 166 (addressing a client’s feeling of betrayal
due to a conflict of interest is important for the legal profession to understand).
183. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (allowing a
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does not eliminate the potential for disclosure of confidential or sensitive
information. Screening measures should be permitted to prevent the
disclosure of information and provide a client with some ease as to whether
or not information is being disclosed and to avoid the negative effects of
law firm imputation.

former client to waive a conflict of interest).
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